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The Effects of Decision Aid Structural Restrictiveness 
on Decision-Making Outcomes 
 
Abstract 
Decision aids are often designed to direct decision-makers’ attention to potential 
problems or solutions prompted by the decision aid; but in most instances, it is 
impossible to prompt all possible issues that should be considered in making a 
decision.  Decision aids can induce decision-making biases whereby users focus 
only on the issues identified by the decision aid and fail to adequately consider other 
issues that are not identified by the decision aid.  The purpose of this study is to 
investigate whether restricting how users interact with computerized decision aids 
affects their performance by limiting their ability to consider other possible problems 
that may not be prompted by the decision aid.  Decision aids often restrict the way a 
user interacts with a decision aid by the rules embedded within computerized 
decision aids.  A more restrictive design imposes more limits on users by forcing 
users to adapt their decision-making process to match the decision aid.  An 
experiment was conducted by varying the differential effect of both a more restrictive 
and less restrictive decision aid on users’ decision-making outcomes.  Results 
indicate that the more restrictive decision aid affects users’ decision-making process 
by increasing their decision-making bias through reducing their ability to identify 
items not specifically prompted by the aid.  This study shows that the degree of 
restrictiveness is an important aspect of decision aid design and has implications for 
both future research and practice. 
Keywords:  decision aid, restrictiveness, decision-making, internal control 
Data Availability:  Data are available upon request. 
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Introduction 
The use of computerized decision aids is widespread in accounting (Bedard et al. 
2008; Dowling and Leech 2007; Mascha and Smedley 2007; Rose and Wolfe 2000).  
Audit firms embed computerized decision aids within their audit support systems to 
assist auditors during the audit process (Bedard et al. 2008; Dowling and Leech 
2007).  Prior research indicates that the use of decision aids results in decision-
making benefits and biases (Arnold et al. 2004; Arnold and Sutton 1998; Dowling 
and Leech 2007; Rose 2002).  One benefit is that decision aids are often used to 
reduce the effects of cognitive constraints by directing users’ attention to items 
prompted by the decision aid (Bonner et al. 1996; Eining and Dorr 1991; Lowe and 
Reckers 2000; Wheeler and Arunachalam 2008).  However, decision aids can 
induce decision-making biases whereby users focus only on the items prompted by 
the decision aid and fail to adequately consider other possibilities (Asare and Wright 
2004; Bierstaker et al. 2009; Fischhoff et al. 1978; Johnson and Kaplan 1996; 
Pincus 1989). 
 
Decision-making bias that might be induced by the decision aid design is an 
important issue because decision aids are not necessarily exhaustive and are 
unlikely to prompt all unique items that should be considered in a particular situation 
(Arnold and Sutton 1998; Dowling and Leech 2007; Glover et al. 1997; Pincus 1989).  
Decision aids used in practice “often do not capture all potentially relevant 
environmental features” (Glover et al. 1997, 242).  An audit partner interviewed by 
Dowling and Leech (2007, 100) warned that a decision aid “is limited in that the 
standard questions do not always cover all risks for a specific client.  Therefore, 
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users need to consider each client’s specific circumstances and whether other risks 
not covered by the decision aid need to be considered”. 
 
This study examines whether restricting how users interact with a computerized 
decision aid affects their performance in identifying potential problems—whether 
they overly focus on items prompted by the decision aid and fail to consider items 
not prompted by the decision aid.  Technology facilitates the choice to embed rules 
into computerized decision aids to restrict how users interact with the aid (DeSanctis 
and Poole 1994; Dowling and Leech 2007).  Organizations design more restrictive 
technologies to control users’ behavior (Dowling and Leech 2007), limit users’ 
activities (Lynch and Gomaa 2003) and constrain users from using the system 
inappropriately (Dowling 2009).  However, organizations should be concerned about 
the impact of a greater degree of restrictiveness on users’ decision-making 
outcomes.  In practice, substantial differences have been identified in the level of 
restrictiveness among the audit support systems used at five large international 
audit firms (Dowling and Leech 2007).  Two of five audit support systems were 
classified by Dowling and Leech (2007) as having a high level of restrictiveness and 
the other three audit support systems were classified as having a low level of 
restrictiveness because the system “does not significantly constrain users 
interaction with the system” (Dowling and Leech 2007, 95).  These observed 
differences raise the empirical question of whether different degrees of 
restrictiveness impact users’ decision-making outcomes. 
 
This study defines decision aid structural restrictiveness as the extent to which a 
decision aid constrains users’ decision-making process through controlling their 
interaction with the aid.  Restriction arises due to the “specific types of rules” 
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embedded within decision aids, described as structural features (DeSanctis and 
Poole 1994, 126).  These structural features determine the degree of structural 
restrictiveness that control how users interact with and employ the technologies 
(Anson et al. 1995; DeSanctis and Poole 1994; Kim et al. 1998; Lynch and Gomaa 
2003; McLeod and Liker 1992; Wheeler and Valacich 1996).  A decision aid can be 
designed to be more structurally-restrictive so that users are forced to employ the 
decision aid in a particular prescribed manner.  Alternatively, a less structurally-
restrictive decision aid can be designed so that users are free to interact with the 
decision aid in any manner they desire.  The more structurally-restrictive design 
imposes more limits on users’ decision-making process because users are forced to 
adapt their decision-making process to match the decision aid. 
 
To examine whether decision aid structural restrictiveness affects users’ decision-
making outcomes, an experiment was conducted in which ninety-four participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups: the more structurally-
restrictive decision aid, the less structurally-restrictive decision aid or no decision aid 
(control group).  Participants were given a case narrative and were required to 
identify all control activities present in the case narrative and recommend control 
activities that were missing and should be present in the case narrative.  Both 
decision aids prompted items for participants to consider in reviewing internal 
controls.  However, both decision aids prompted only a subset of the control 
activities in the case narrative. 
 
Results show that participants using the more structurally-restrictive decision aid did 
not identify any more items prompted by the aid than those using the less 
structurally-restrictive decision aid.  However, participants in the more structurally-
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restrictive decision aid group identified fewer items not prompted by the decision aid, 
indicating that the more structurally-restrictive decision aid increased the decision-
making bias of failing to consider non-prompted items.  The results also show that 
participants using either type of decision aid identified more prompted items and 
fewer non-prompted items than unaided participants in the control group, which is 
consistent with prior research. 
 
This study informs practice about the use of structurally-restrictive decision aids.  
Organizations that design structurally-restrictive decision aids should be concerned 
as the results indicate that users of a more restrictive decision aid are less likely to 
identify items not prompted by the aid.  This awareness will enable organizations to 
make more-informed decisions about the design of decision aids.  Prior research 
has examined the effects of decision aid design on decision quality, including the 
orientation of decision aids (Bedard and Graham 2002), the information content of 
decision aids (Johnson and Kaplan 1996) and the information sequence of decision 
aids (Reneau and Blanthorne 2001).  This study contributes to the decision aid 
literature by showing that the degree of structural restrictiveness is an important 
aspect of the design of decision aids.  The results indicate that structurally-restrictive 
decision aids affect users’ decision-making process by increasing their decision-
making bias through reducing their ability to identify items not specifically prompted 
by the aid. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section reviews 
relevant literature and develops the hypotheses.  The subsequent sections describe 
the research method and present the results.  The implications, limitations and 
opportunities for future research are discussed in the final section. 
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Background and Hypotheses 
A major decision-making benefit of using a decision aid is “to provide a structure for 
the task” as the prompting from the decision aid allows decision-makers to consider 
the task in a systematic manner (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001, 142).  The 
prompting from a decision aid assists users to facilitate their thoughts and focus on 
relevant items (Pieptea and Anderson 1987).  Prior research show that decision aids 
are beneficial during the decision-making process as users’ attention is directed to 
items prompted by the decision aid in the context of judging conditional probability 
(Bonner et al. 1996), assessing inventory obsolescence (Lowe and Reckers 2000), 
estimating unfamiliar scenarios (MacGregor et al. 1988) and judging importance of 
tax cases (Wheeler and Arunachalam 2008). 
 
Although the use of decision aids is beneficial in assisting users to focus on certain 
items during the decision-making process, decision aids can induce decision-making 
biases whereby users focus only on the items prompted by the decision aid and fail 
to adequately consider items not prompted by the decision aid (Asare and Wright 
2004; Fischhoff et al. 1978; Johnson and Kaplan 1996; Pincus 1989; Wheeler and 
Arunachalam 2008).  For example, auditors provided with a decision aid under-
assessed the possibility of fraud risk because they focused only on factors prompted 
by the decision aid and did not adequately consider other factors that were not 
prompted by the decision aid (Asare and Wright 2004; Pincus 1989).  Prior studies 
in the output interference literature also show that the act of recalling the prompted 
items interferes with participants’ ability to recall the non-prompted items (Frederick 
1991; Hoch 1984; Nickerson 1984; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981). 
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Accordingly, it is hypothesized that aided decision-makers will perform better than 
unaided decision-makers in identifying items prompted by the decision aid.  
However, unaided decision-makers will perform better than aided decision-makers 
in identifying items not prompted by the decision aid. 
H1 : Decision-makers using a decision aid that prompts them to 
consider specific items will correctly identify more of the prompted 
items than unaided decision-makers. 
H2 : Decision-makers using a decision aid that prompts them to 
consider specific items will correctly identify fewer non-prompted 
items than unaided decision-makers. 
 
After considering the effects of using decision aids, prior research is extended by 
investigating the effects of structural restrictiveness embedded within a 
computerized decision aid on users’ decision-making outcomes.  There are different 
views of restrictiveness in the literature.  System restrictiveness was initially defined 
by Silver (1988, 912) in the information systems literature as “the degree to which 
and the manner in which a Decision Support System restricts its users’ decision 
making processes to a particular subset of all possible processes.”  The restriction 
on users’ decision-making process can be achieved by focusing on the type of 
features supported by the system (Chu and Elam 1990; Speier and Morris 2003; 
Wang and Benbasat 2009) or focusing on users’ interaction with the features 
(DeSanctis and Poole 1994; McLeod and Liker 1992; Wheeler and Valacich 1996).  
This study defines decision aid structural restrictiveness as the extent to which a 
decision aid constrains users’ decision-making process through controlling their 
interaction with the aid. 
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Structural restrictiveness focuses on the structural features embedded within the 
technology that restrict how users interact with the technology (Anson et al. 1995; 
DeSanctis and Poole 1994; Kim et al. 1998; Lynch and Gomaa 2003; McLeod and 
Liker 1992; Wheeler and Valacich 1996).  Structural features are regarded as the 
“specific types of rules” (DeSanctis and Poole 1994, 126) embedded within the 
system and “explicit rules and procedures embedded in the software” (McLeod and 
Liker 1992, 195), which act as a form of control (Lynch and Gomaa 2003).  A more-
restrictive system tends to include “more embedded control mechanisms that limit 
the range of activities in which individuals can engage” (Lynch and Gomaa 2003, 
304).  Wheeler and Valacich (1996) found groups using the more structurally-
restrictive group support system (GSS) improved their decision quality.  However, 
Kim et al. (1998) found groups using the less structurally-restrictive GSS had higher 
decision quality and satisfaction measures.  Anson et al. (1995) show that a GSS 
restricted groups’ decision-making process but did not significantly improve task 
performance.  The results of the effects of structural restrictiveness on group’s 
decision-making outcomes have been mixed and it is unclear whether the findings 
will generalize to an individual’s decision-making outcomes. 
 
Structural restrictiveness relates to how a decision aid is designed to restrict the 
interaction between users and the features included in the aid.  Decision aids vary in 
terms of the degree of structural restrictiveness embedded within the design.  For 
example, consider two decision aids that contain the same number of fields in their 
search engine but differ in how freely users can interact with these fields.  The 
search engine of the more-restrictive decision aid will force users to enter data for 
each field before searching as compared with a less-restrictive aid which allows 
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empty fields before searching.  The more-restrictive design will force users to use 
the search engine in a particular prescribed manner as compared with a less-
restrictive design where users are free to use the search engine in any manner they 
desire.  The interaction between users and features of the decision aid will 
determine the manner in which the aid affects a user’s decision-making process. 
 
Prior research has utilized Anderson’s (1982) Adaptive Character of Thought (ACT*) 
theory to examine the effects of decision aid on knowledge acquisition (Mascha 
2001; Pei et al. 1994; Smedley and Sutton 2004; Steinbart and Accola 1994).  
However, this study focuses on whether restricting how users interact with decision 
aids limits their ability to consider other possible problems that may not be prompted 
by the decision aid.  Nickerson (1984, 550) reviewed several theoretical 
explanations for the output interference phenomenon and argued the Search of 
Associative Memory (SAM) theory proposed by Raaijmakers and Shiffrin (1981) 
provides “the most adequate account of the inhibitory efforts of part-set cuing.”  
Thus, this study utilizes the SAM theory (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981) as the 
theoretical framework. 
 
Based upon the SAM theory (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981), the memory-retrieval 
process of a decision-maker using a decision aid resembles a cued-recall process 
(see Figure 1).  By restricting how a decision-maker interacts with a decision aid, the 
degree of structural restrictiveness is expected to affect the extent to which using 
the decision aid prompts the decision-maker’s memory.  Applying the SAM theory 
(Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981) to a decision-making context, decision-makers’ 
knowledge of items is encoded and stored in their long-term memory as images.  
While making a decision for a specific case, decision-makers first collect case-
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specific probe cues in their short-term memory.1   The case-specific probe cues 
gathered in decision-makers’ short-term memory then activate images of items in 
their long-term memory to varying degrees during the sampling and recovery 
phases.  According to SAM theory (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981), the degree of 
activation depends on the strength of association between case-specific probe cues 
stored in decision-makers’ short-term memory and images of items stored in their 
long-term memory.  An item which has a higher strength of association has a higher 
probability of being elicited from the long-term memory of a decision-maker due to 
the stronger activation and thus it is more likely to be identified by a decision-maker. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Items prompted by a decision aid have a higher degree of activation from a 
decision-maker’s long-term memory compared with non-prompted items because 
prompting strengthens the association between case-specific probe cues stored in a 
decision-maker’s short-term working memory and knowledge of the items stored in 
their long-term memory (Nickerson 1984; Pei and Tuttle 1999).  This study posits 
that the strength of the prompts in a decision-maker’s memory can be differentiated 
by the degree of structural restrictiveness embedded within a decision aid. 
 
McLeod and Liker (1992, 195) asserted that a more restrictive system contains 
“explicit rules and procedures” to govern users’ interaction with the system.  
Wheeler and Valacich (1996) found users of a more-restrictive system followed the 
                                            
1
 The role of the short-term memory is to serve as a working memory system to hold newly 
presented information temporarily in the mind so that decision-makers can process the 
information and store it in their long-term memory.  The distinction between short-term 
memory and long-term memory relates to whether the newly-presented information has been 
coded and processed (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981).  The distinction does not relate to 
items’ length of duration in individuals’ memory. 
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structure of the rules and possible activities supported by the system more closely 
than those using the less-restrictive system.  As users of a more structurally-
restrictive decision aid are forced to adapt their decision-making process to match 
the decision aid, they are likely to consider the items prompted by the aid more 
closely than those using a less structurally-restrictive decision aid.  Thus, a more 
structurally-restrictive decision aid is expected to increase the prominence of the 
prompted items in a user’s short-term memory.  The prompts serve as questions to 
trigger the memory-retrieval process so that users can rely on the questions 
prompted by the decision aid to retrieve knowledge of items stored in their long-term 
memory (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981).  Based on SAM theory (Raaijmakers and 
Shiffrin 1981), the increased prominence of the prompting induced by a more 
structurally-restrictive design is likely to result in a higher strength of association 
between the prompted questions stored in decision-makers’ short-term memory and 
the knowledge of items stored in their long-term memory.  Ratcliff et al. (1990a, 
1990b) show that the strength of association between the prompts in decision-
makers’ short-term memory and the knowledge of items stored in their long-term 
memory can be increased by studying the prompts longer or repeating the prompts. 
 
These more prominent prompted items end up as even stronger items in a user’s 
memory and result in blocking the recall of the weaker non-prompted items by 
reducing the strength of association for the weaker non-prompted items 
(Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981).  Thus, the degree of structural restrictiveness 
embedded within a decision aid is also likely to affect the strength of the interference 
effect for the non-prompted items.  As the probability of recalling these stronger 
prompted items is expected to be higher, decision-makers using a more structurally-
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restrictive decision aid are more likely to recall stronger prompted items rather than 
weaker non-prompted items (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981). 
 
In addition, decision-makers using a more structurally-restrictive decision aid are 
forced to follow the structure imposed on their decision-making process (Lynch and 
Gomaa 2003; McLeod and Liker 1992; Wheeler and Valacich 1996).  Thus, they are 
more likely to consider all the prompted items compared with decision-makers using 
a less structurally-restrictive decision aid, creating a stronger interference effect for 
non-prompted items.  Due to the stronger interference effect for non-prompted items, 
the elicited images of decision-makers using a more structurally-restrictive decision 
aid are expected to contain a greater number of stronger prompted items and a 
smaller number of weaker non-prompted items compared with those using a less 
structurally-restrictive decision aid. 
 
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that decision-makers using a more structurally-
restrictive decision aid are more likely than those using a less structurally-restrictive 
decision aid to recall prompted items.  However, decision-makers using a more 
structurally-restrictive decision aid are less likely than those using a less structurally-
restrictive decision aid to recall non-prompted items. 
H3 : Decision-makers using a more structurally-restrictive decision aid 
will correctly identify more of the prompted items than decision-
makers using a less structurally-restrictive decision aid. 
H4 : Decision-makers using a more structurally-restrictive decision aid 
will correctly identify fewer non-prompted items than decision-
makers using a less structurally-restrictive decision aid. 
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Research Method 
The experiment adopts a 1 x 3 between-subjects design.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups: the more structurally-
restrictive decision aid, the less structurally-restrictive decision aid or no decision aid 
(control group).  Participants were given a case narrative of a company’s order 
entry/sales process.2  The case narrative includes internal control strengths and 
weaknesses.  The control group evaluated the case without the assistance of a 
decision aid.  The two aided groups had a decision aid that prompted them to 
consider certain items of information before reaching a decision.  The decision task 
was to identify all control activities present in the case narrative and recommend 
control activities that were missing and should be present in the case narrative. 
 
The context of internal control evaluation was selected because decision aids are 
often employed by audit firms in evaluating internal control systems.  Dowling and 
Leech (2007) reported that decision aids were widely used by the Big 4 and one 
large mid-tier international audit firms in evaluating internal control systems.  Bryant 
et al. (2009) also stated that audit firms employed decision aids to evaluate the 
internal control environment.  In an earlier study, Abdolmohammadi and Usoff (2001) 
collected data from experienced managers and partners from various international 
audit firms and reported that decision aids were widely used during the internal 
control evaluation stage of the audit. 
 
                                            
2
 The case narrative and model solutions were validated over three stages by academics 
with teaching experience of internal control evaluation.  The model solutions provided the 
normative solutions against which participants’ answers were assessed. 
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Participants 
In order to ensure that the participants had sufficient knowledge to complete the 
decision task, participants were recruited from an accounting information systems 
class that had extensive coverage of internal controls for the order entry/sales 
process. 3   Prior to experiment, the participants completed two major semester 
assignments on the order entry/sales process, which constituted 40 percent of the 
total assessment for the class.  Thus participants were expected to have the 
knowledge to complete the decision task.  Two incentives were provided to motivate 
participation and effort.  First, each participant was compensated $20 for their 
participation time.  Second, each participant was entered into a lottery to win one of 
three $150 book vouchers if their performance was among the top 25 percent. 
 
Decision Aids 
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, two versions of a computerized decision aid that differ 
in structural restrictiveness were developed.  The computerized decision aids took 
the form of list aids as checklists are commonly used by audit firms to evaluate 
clients’ internal controls (Bryant et al. 2009; Dowling and Leech 2007).  In the less 
structurally-restrictive condition, participants were given access to a computerized 
decision aid which contained a list of issues to consider (prompted items) when 
identifying the present and missing control activities.4  An example of the prompted 
                                            
3
 Students were chosen as the participant group because they are considered a 
homogenous group and their knowledge of control activities is less likely to vary compared 
with practicing auditors because of the latters’ varied experiences (Frederick 1991) and 
training (Tan 2001).  Besides, Eining and Dorr (1991) argues that students are appropriate 
participants for internal control evaluation task as it is a task that would normally be 
performed by entry-level auditors. 
4
 The questions were validated over two stages by academics with teaching experience of 
internal control evaluation.  During the first stage, an initial list of control activities was 
compiled from the course materials and prescribed textbook (Gelinas et al., 2005) of the 
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items was “Does the system perform programmed edit checks such as data input 
validation checks?”  The issues were embedded in the middle frame of the screen 
and participants could scroll up and down to examine the items in any manner they 
desire.  The items prompted only a subset of the control activities in the case 
narrative.  The items served as a reference for participants to use in identifying the 
present and missing control activities in the case.  Participants entered their 
identified present and missing control activities in the bottom frame of the screen 
and submitted their answers.  There were no embedded structural features which 
restrict how a participant interacts with and uses the decision aid.  Participants were 
also asked whether there were any other control activities in the case narrative that 
were not prompted by the checklist provided in the decision aid (non-prompted 
items). 
 
The more structurally-restrictive decision aid contained the same prompted issues in 
the same order as the less structurally-restrictive aid.  Ensuring that the information 
content of the decision aid is equivalent across treatment conditions reduces the 
potential for any bias (Johnson and Kaplan 1996).  The two conditions differed only 
in terms of the way in which the participants interacted with the aid.  In the more 
structurally-restrictive condition, participants were prompted with each item 
individually and they were required to determine whether that item was present or 
missing in the case.  Participants were not allowed to skip any item and were only 
                                                                                                                            
accounting information systems class from which the participants were recruited.  Five 
experts rated the extent to which they believed a participant will be able to identify the listed 
control activities.  Half of the control activities were excluded from the list (non-prompted 
items) so that the list prompted only a subset of the control activities in the case narrative 
(prompted items).  The mean of the prompted and non-prompted control activities are similar, 
suggesting that the expected knowledge of participants with respect to prompted and non-
prompted control activities is similar.  In the second stage, three experts rated the clarity of 
questions as very high. 
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allowed to proceed to the next item after they have made a decision on the current 
item.  After addressing all of the prompted items, participants were asked whether 
there were any other control activities in the case narrative that were not prompted 
by the earlier items (non-prompted items).5  Once participants identified the non-
prompted items, the aid automatically displayed all their earlier identified present 
and missing control activities.  Participants were allowed to review their responses 
before they submit their answers. 
 
The two versions of the computerized decision aid were embedded within web-
based software.  The web-based software was developed by an independent 
software programmer.  Extensive validation exercises were conducted during the 
software development process to ensure that the software-captured data matched 
the inputted test data.  Participants who were assigned to the “no decision aid” 
control group also logged on to the web-based software to complete the 
experimental task but they did not have a decision aid that prompted them with 
items to consider in making their decision. 
 
Procedures 
Participants attended one of eight experimental sessions.6  In order to ensure the 
consistency of instructions across all of the experimental sessions, the same 
                                            
5
 All participants using the more structurally-restrictive decision aid answered that there were 
other control activities that were not prompted by the checklist provided in the decision aid, 
showing that they were aware of non-prompted control activities. 
6
 Eight experimental sessions were conducted over six consecutive working days in the 
same computer experimental research laboratory.  Each experimental session lasted 
between one and one-quarter and one and one-half hours.  The experimental materials were 
tested by 39 participants during the pilot studies.  Pre-pilot validation studies were also 
conducted, involving 56 participants.  The 94 participants who completed the experiment 
were not involved in the earlier pilot and pre-pilot studies. 
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researcher was present for all sessions and followed a written script when providing 
verbal instructions during the experiment.  The experiment proceeded in six phases.  
During the first phase, participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
experimental groups.  They were asked to read the statement of purpose and 
procedures of the experiment, and sign an informed consent.  The paper-based 
knowledge test was conducted in the second phase.  The knowledge test consisted 
of three internal control failure scenarios.  The three scenarios focused specifically 
on knowledge of control activities because the experimental task was related to 
identification of control activities.  After the knowledge test, participants were told to 
log into the web-based software with their assigned User ID and password.  During 
the third phase, participants entered their personal details so that their demographic 
profiles were collected.  Training was conducted in the fourth phase.  The software 
presented participants in different experimental groups with different familiarization 
screens to familiarize them with the screen layout that they would see during the 
experiment.  Participants then proceeded with the training case. 
 
Participants completed the experimental case during the fifth phase.  Participants 
read the case narrative and were instructed to identify all control activities present in 
the case narrative and recommend control activities that were missing and should 
be present in the case narrative (i.e. areas requiring improvement in internal control 
in order to have effective overall control).  After reading the case narrative, 
participants were required to enter their answers into the software.  The decision aid 
was embedded within the software.  Therefore, participants experienced different 
screens based on their assigned experimental group.  During the last phase, 
participants completed the manipulation-check question and feedback questions on 
17 
their perceived reliance on the decision aid.7  For the manipulation-check question, 
participants were asked whether the web-based software provided them with 
questions to assist them in identifying the present and missing control activities. 
 
Variables 
A summary of the dependent variables is provided in Table 1.  The experimental 
case contained 17 control activities, of which eight were prompted by the decision 
aid and the remaining nine were not prompted.  Four of the eight prompted control 
activities were present in the case narrative and the remaining four control activities 
were missing in the case narrative.  As for the nine non-prompted control activities, 
five control activities were present in the case narrative and the remaining four 
control activities were missing in the case narrative.  Based on the validated model 
solutions, a point was awarded for each control activity identified correctly by the 
participant. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Participants’ pre-existing knowledge of control activities was used as a covariate in 
the data analysis because task-specific knowledge is an important determinant of 
judgment performance (Bonner and Lewis 1990; Choo and Trotman 1991; Frederick 
1991; Libby and Luft 1993).  The paper-based knowledge test consisted of three 
internal control scenarios and each scenario was allocated four points.  The score of 
                                            
7
 Participants could interact with the less structurally-restrictive decision aid in any manner 
because there were no structural features embedded within the decision aid to restrict 
participants’ use.  Therefore, there was a risk that participants using the less structurally-
restrictive decision aid might not rely on the decision aid.  The results show that perceived 
reliance on the decision aid is not significantly different between participants using the less 
structurally-restrictive decision aid and those using the more structurally-restrictive decision 
aid (p=0.248).  The perceived reliance questions were adapted from Hampton (2005) and 
the Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.729. 
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the knowledge test, converted to a percentage, was used as a covariate in data 
analysis. 
 
Results 
Demographic Data 
Ninety-four participants started and completed the experiment.  Four participants 
who failed the manipulation check were excluded from the final useable sample.8  
The final useable sample of 90 participants consisted of 29 in the no decision aid 
group, 31 in the less structurally-restrictive decision aid group and 30 in the more 
structurally-restrictive decision aid group. 
 
A summary of the demographic details of the participants is shown in Table 2.  
Participants were enrolled in an accounting information systems class and the 
majority of them were commerce students [93.4 percent].  Eight-nine percent of the 
participants were first-year students.  The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 
25 with the majority of them in the 18 to 21 age group [95.6 percent].  More than half 
of the participants [57.8 percent] had working experience.  Participants’ pre-existing 
knowledge of control activities was collected through the paper-based knowledge 
test.  The mean value of the participants’ pre-existing knowledge of control activities 
is 55.93 percent [std. dev.=24.96]. 
 
There is no significant difference among the three experimental groups in terms of 
gender [Pearson Chi-Square=3.499, p=0.174], age [Kruskal-Wallis Chi-
                                            
8
 The results of the hypotheses tests hold when the four participants who failed the 
manipulation check were included in the sample. 
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Square=4.574, p=0.102], degree enrolled [Pearson Chi-Square=2.038, p=0.729], 
year of degree [Pearson Chi-Square=2.913, p=0.573], working experience [Pearson 
Chi-Square=0.763, p=0.683] and pre-existing knowledge of control activities 
[F(2,87)=0.936, p=0.396], suggesting that random assignment of participants to 
experimental groups occurred. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables.9  Participants 
using the less structurally-restrictive decision aid identified the most prompted 
control activities [mean=5.02, std. dev.=2.12].  Unaided participants identified the 
least prompted control activities [mean=3.24, std. dev.=1.33] but they identified the 
most non-prompted control activities [mean=4.19, std. dev.=1.83].  Participants 
using the more structurally-restrictive decision aid identified the least non-prompted 
control activities [mean=2.45, std. dev.=1.83]. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
The primary analysis was conducted using an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
with planned contrast tests.  The ANCOVA results in Table 4 (Panel A) show that 
after controlling for pre-existing knowledge, there is a significant difference among 
                                            
9
 The researcher and an independent expert were involved in the coding process of the 
dependent variables.  The two coded data sets were analyzed for inter-coder agreement 
using Cohen’s Kappa statistic (Cohen 1960).  The Kappa coefficients range from 0.927 to 
0.958, indicating that the coders achieved a very high degree of agreement.  Another 
independent expert was employed for the coding process of the knowledge test.  The Kappa 
coefficients for the coding of the knowledge test range from 0.911 to 0.941, indicating that 
the coders achieved a very high degree of agreement. 
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the three different experimental groups in the number of control activities identified 
that were prompted by the decision aid (Total Prompted) [F(2,86)=7.511, p=0.001].  
Knowledge also has a significant effect on the number of prompted control activities 
identified (Total Prompted) [F(1,86)=36.65, p<0.001]. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, a planned contrast test was performed.  As shown in 
Table 4 (Panel B), participants using a decision aid identified more prompted control 
activities than unaided participants (mean difference for “Total Prompted”=1.35).  
The planned contrast test indicates that the mean difference is significant 
[F(2,86)=14.898, p<0.001], supporting Hypothesis 1.  The findings support the 
positive attention-directing effects of prompting from a decision aid on a decision-
maker’s performance.  The results corroborate the findings of prior studies which 
show that users’ attention is directed to items prompted by the decision aid (Bonner 
et al. 1996; Eining and Dorr 1991; Lowe and Reckers 2000; Wheeler and 
Arunachalam 2008). 
 
As for the number of control activities identified that were not prompted by the 
decision aid (Total Non-Prompted), there is also a significant difference among the 
three different experimental groups after controlling for pre-existing knowledge 
[F(2,86)=10.356, p<0.001] (Table 5, Panel A).  Knowledge also has a significant 
effect on the number of non-prompted control activities identified (Total Non-
Prompted) [F(1,86)=33.415, p<0.001]. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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A similar planned contrast test was performed to test Hypothesis 2.  As shown in 
Table 5 (Panel B), participants using a decision aid identified fewer non-prompted 
control activities than unaided participants (mean difference for “Total Non-
Prompted”=1.38).  The planned contrast test indicates that the mean difference is 
significant [F(2,86)=14.787, p<0.001], supporting Hypothesis 2.  The findings 
support the negative effects of prompting on decision-makers’ performance in 
identifying non-prompted items.  Support for Hypothesis 2 provides evidence of the 
decision-making bias as participants using a decision aid did not adequately 
consider other non-prompted control activities.  Although using a decision aid 
improved participants’ performance as they were able to identify more prompted 
control activities, participants ended up identifying fewer non-prompted control 
activities than unaided participants.  The results corroborate the findings of prior 
research which show that the use of decision aids induces decision-making biases, 
which cause users to focus only on items prompted by the decision aid and 
inadequately consider other items not prompted by the decision aid (Asare and 
Wright 2004; Fischhoff et al. 1978; Johnson and Kaplan 1996; Pincus 1989). 
 
In order to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, similar planned contrast tests were performed.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants using a more structurally-restrictive decision 
aid will identify more prompted items than participants using a less structurally-
restrictive decision aid.  However, as shown in Table 4 (Panel B), participants using 
the more structurally-restrictive decision aid identified fewer prompted control 
activities (mean difference for “Total Prompted”=0.14) and structural restrictiveness 
has no effects on identifying prompted items [F(2,86)=0.126, p=0.724].  Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  The findings suggest that a greater degree of 
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structural restrictiveness embedded within a decision aid does not provide 
incremental benefits in identifying prompted control activities. 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that participants using a more structurally-restrictive decision 
aid will identify fewer non-prompted items than participants using a less structurally-
restrictive decision aid.  As shown in Table 5 (Panel B), participants using the more 
structurally-restrictive decision aid identified fewer non-prompted control activities 
than those using the less structurally-restrictive decision aid (mean difference for 
“Total Non-Prompted”=0.99).  The planned contrast test indicates that the mean 
difference is significant [F(2,86)=5.909, p=0.017], supporting Hypothesis 4. 
 
The results show that a greater degree of structural restrictiveness affects 
participants’ ability to identify non-prompted control activities.  Increasing the degree 
of structural restrictiveness increases the decision-making bias in recalling non-
prompted items, thus participants using the more structurally-restrictive decision aid 
are less likely to consider non-prompted control activities.  As a result, they identified 
fewer non-prompted control activities than decision-makers using the less 
structurally-restrictive decision aid. 
 
Post Hoc Analyses 
The web-based software automatically captured the time spent by participants in 
completing the decision task.  Time spent on the decision task was not significantly 
different between participants using the less structurally-restrictive decision aid and 
those using the more structurally-restrictive decision aid (p=0.891).  In addition, time 
spent on the decision task was separately included as a covariate in additional 
ANCOVA analyses and the results were consistent with those reported. 
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The present and missing control activities were then examined separately.  As 
shown in Table 6 (Panel A), participants using a decision aid identified more 
prompted missing control activities (Prompted Missing) than unaided participants 
and the mean difference of 1.18 is significant [F(2,86)=23.472, p<0.001].  In contrast, 
there is no effect for identifying prompted present control activities (Prompted 
Present) [F(2,86)=0.651, p=0.422].  The findings show that the results for “Total 
Prompted” are driven primarily by “Prompted Missing”.  This suggests that the 
positive attention-directing effects of prompting from a decision aid is beneficial for 
identifying missing control activities but has no effect on identifying present control 
activities. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
As for the non-prompted items (Table 6, Panel B), participants using a decision aid 
identified fewer non-prompted present control activities than unaided participants 
(mean difference for “Non-Prompted Present”=0.77) and the mean difference is 
significant [F(2,86)=8.528, p=0.004].  The mean difference for “Non-Prompted 
Missing” is also significant [F(2,86)=9.658, p=0.003].  The findings indicate that 
prompting from the decision aid interferes with participants’ ability to recall the non-
prompted control activities, regardless of whether the control activity was present or 
missing in the case narrative. 
 
As for the comparison between participants using the more structurally-restrictive 
decision aid and those using the less structurally-restrictive decision aid, the results 
for “Prompted Present” [F(2,86)=1.048, p=0.309] and “Prompted Missing” 
[F(2,86)=0.16, p=0.69] are consistent with the results for “Total Prompted” (Table 6, 
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Panel C).  The findings provide evidence that a greater degree of structural 
restrictiveness embedded within a decision aid has no effects in identifying 
prompted control activities, regardless of whether the control activity was present or 
missing in the case narrative. 
 
As shown in Table 6 (Panel D), the mean difference between participants using the 
more structurally-restrictive decision aid and those using the less structurally-
restrictive decision aid is significant for “Non-Prompted Present” [F(2,86)=7.077, 
p=0.009].  However, structural restrictiveness has no effects on “Non-Prompted 
Missing” [F(2,86)=0.752, p=0.388].  The findings show that the decision-making bias 
in recalling non-prompted items arises in relation to identifying present control 
activities but not for missing control activities. 
 
Last, participants’ incorrect answers were analyzed.  The contrast test indicates that 
the number of incorrect answers is not significantly different between aided and 
unaided participants [F(2,86)=-0.281, p=0.652].  The number of incorrect answers is 
also not significantly different between participants using the more structurally-
restrictive decision aid and those using the less structurally-restrictive decision aid 
[F(2,86)=-0.098, p=0.89]. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of structural restrictiveness embedded within a 
computerized decision aid on users’ decision-making outcomes.  The main findings 
indicate that the performances of participants using the more structurally-restrictive 
decision aid and those using the less structurally-restrictive decision aid differed with 
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respect to identifying control activities not prompted by the decision aid.  Results 
show that participants using the more structurally-restrictive decision aid identified 
fewer non-prompted items than those using the less structurally-restrictive decision 
aid, indicating that a greater degree of structural restrictiveness increases users’ 
decision-making bias in identifying non-prompted items. 
 
This study contributes to the decision aid literature by showing that the degree of 
structural restrictiveness is an important aspect of decision aid design as 
participants using the more structurally-restrictive decision aid identified fewer non-
prompted items.  This study adds to prior research by demonstrating the design of 
decision aids is important as it can affect users’ decision-making outcomes (Bedard 
and Graham 2002; Johnson and Kaplan 1996; Reneau and Blanthorne 2001).  This 
study also provides insights into the decision-making benefit of prompting by a 
decision aid by examining present and missing control activities separately.  The 
post hoc analyses show that prompting by a decision aid results in a positive effect 
for identifying missing items but not for present items.  Thus, the decision-making 
benefit of prompting by a decision aid is dependent on whether the item is present 
or missing. 
 
An increase in decision-making bias should be a concern to organizations that 
design structurally-restrictive decision aids because users are less likely to identify 
non-prompted items with the assistance of a structurally-restrictive decision aid.  In 
most instances, prompting for all possible items that should be considered in making 
a decision is impossible (Glover et al. 1997; Pincus 1989; Purvis 1989).  Depending 
on the consequences of failing to identify non-prompted items, an increase in 
decision-making bias may have effectiveness and efficiency implications.  For 
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example, if a user fails to identify a non-prompted item and ends up with a wrong 
judgment, it impacts the effectiveness of the decision-making process.  On the other 
hand, if a user fails to identify a non-prompted item and requires more effort to reach 
a judgment, it impacts the efficiency of the decision-making process.  Therefore, 
understanding the effects of the design of decision aids on users’ decision-making 
outcomes is important for practice because of the effectiveness and efficiency 
implications caused by the increase in decision-making bias.  The findings enable 
organizations to make more-informed decisions about the design of decision aids by 
making them aware of the effects of structural restrictiveness embedded within a 
decision aid on users’ decision-making outcomes. 
 
There are limitations in this study.  The first limitation deals with the 
operationalization of structural restrictiveness.  In this study, structural 
restrictiveness was operationalized by forcing participants to answer each issue 
individually and not allowing participants to skip any issue.  Structural restrictiveness 
may be operationalized in other ways.  For example, based on participants’ 
response to an issue, the decision aid may present other related issues.  Another 
limitation relates to the reliability of the knowledge covariate.  The knowledge 
covariate was measured by a paper-based knowledge test because the ethical rules 
of the University where the study was conducted did not permit the researcher to 
obtain the results of the accounting information systems class from which the 
participants were recruited. 
 
There are also limitations in generalizing the findings to all users of decision aids as 
only one type of decision aid in the form of a computerized list aid was examined in 
this study.  In addition, the setting chosen for this study related to internal control 
27 
evaluation.  In the experimental setting of this study, participants were given a 
written case narrative and required to identify the present and missing control 
activities in the narrative.  However, internal control evaluation is more complex in 
an actual field setting within an organization.  Besides examining documentations, 
decision-makers also observe the actual business processes and interview people 
to evaluate the internal controls. 
 
While this research specifically examines whether structural restrictiveness 
embedded in a decision aid increases biases, future research should examine 
strategies that might be used to mitigate this bias.  There are several areas for 
future research that could take the next step and examine those strategies.  Future 
research could examine users’ decision-making processes to gain insights into how 
users interact with either more structurally-restrictive decision aids or less 
structurally-restrictive decision aids.  Such a study could contribute to a better 
understanding of the decision-making bias of failing to consider items not prompted 
by the decision aid.  This work would enable researchers to devise strategies to 
mitigate the decision-making bias. 
 
While this study used novice participants to examine bias associated with using a 
structurally-restrictive decision aid, whether this result will hold with experienced 
participants is unknown.  Future research could examine decision-making expertise 
as an experimental factor.  Such a study could investigate whether the degree of 
structural restrictiveness has differential effects on expert and novice decision-
makers.  Third, this study examined only one type of decision aid in the form of a 
computerized list aid.  Future research is required to test the degree to which the 
findings can be generalized to a variety of decision aids.  Last, future research could 
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examine the effects of the degree of structural restrictiveness embedded within 
decision aids on users’ experiential learning.  Such a study would be of interest to 
practice as decision aids are deployed in practice to develop professional expertise 
(Eining and Dorr 1991; Rose 2002). 
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Figure 1. A Flowchart for the Memory-Retrieval Process of Identifying Items 
Based Upon SAM Theory (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1981) 
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Table 1. Summary of Dependent Variables 
Variables Hypotheses Explanation 
Prompted Present H1 and H3 Number of control activities identified by 
the participants that were present in the 
case and prompted by the decision aid 
Prompted Missing H1 and H3 Number of control activities identified by 
the participants that were missing in the 
case and prompted by the decision aid 
Total Prompted H1 and H3 Total number of control activities identified 
that were prompted by the decision aid 
Non-Prompted Present H2 and H4 Number of control activities identified by 
the participants that were present in the 
case and not prompted by the decision aid 
Non-Prompted Missing H2 and H4 Number of control activities identified by 
the participants that were missing in the 
case and not prompted by the decision aid 
Total Non-Prompted H2 and H4 Total number of control activities identified 
that were not prompted by the decision aid 
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Table 2. Demographic Information 
 
No 
Decision 
Aid 
(n=29) 
Less 
Structurally-
Restrictive 
Decision 
Aid 
(n=31) 
More 
Structurally-
Restrictive 
Decision 
Aid 
(n=30) 
Total 
(n=90) 
% of 
Total 
Gender a: 
Male 13 13 7 33 36.7% 
Female 16 18 23 57 63.3% 
Total 29 31 30 90 100% 
Age b: 
18 5 9 3 17 18.9% 
19 12 14 14 40 44.4% 
20 9 7 9 25 27.9% 
21 1 1 2 4 4.4% 
Over 21 years 2 0 2 4 4.4% 
Total 29 31 30 90 100% 
Mean (Std. Dev.) 20 (1.35) 19 (0.82) 20 (1.62) 19 (1.32)  
Degree Enrolled c: 
Commerce 28 29 27 84 93.4% 
Commerce and Law 0 1 2 3 3.3% 
Other 1 1 1 3 3.3% 
Total 29 31 30 90 100% 
Year of Degree d: 
Year 1 28 27 25 80 88.9% 
Year 2 1 3 4 8 8.9% 
Year 3 0 1 1 2 2.2% 
Total 29 31 30 90 100% 
Working Experience e: 
Yes 18 16 18 52 57.8% 
No 11 15 12 38 42.2% 
Knowledge f: 
Mean (Std. Dev.) 51.72% 
(26.76%) 
60.48% 
(25.18%) 
55.28% 
(22.90%) 
55.93% 
(24.96%) 
 
a
 Not significantly different among the three groups [Pearson Chi-Square=3.499, p=0.174] 
b
 Not significantly different among the three groups [Kruskal-Wallis Chi-Square=4.574, p=0.102] 
c
 Not significantly different among the three groups [Pearson Chi-Square=2.038, p=0.729] 
 The 3 other degrees include Commerce and Science, Commerce and Arts and Education. 
d
 Not significantly different among the three groups [Pearson Chi-Square=2.913, p=0.573] 
e
 Not significantly different among the three groups [Pearson Chi-Square=0.763, p=0.683] 
f
 A knowledge test was conducted to measure the participants’ pre-existing knowledge of control activities.  
The test consisted of three internal control scenarios and each scenario was allocated four points.  The total 
score was converted to a percentage.  Analysis of variance results show that the participants’ pre-existing 
knowledge of control activities is not significantly different among the three groups [F(2,87)=0.936, p=0.396]. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
Variables 
No 
Decision Aid 
(n=29) 
Less 
Structurally-
Restrictive 
Decision Aid 
(n=31) 
More 
Structurally-
Restrictive 
Decision Aid 
(n=30) 
Total 
(n=90) 
Prompted Present a 
- Mean (Std. Dev.) 
- Min (Max) 
 
2.41 (0.92) 
1 (4) 
 
2.89 (1.03) 
0 (4) 
 
2.53 (1.23) 
0 (4) 
 
2.62 (1.08) 
0 (4) 
Prompted Missing b 
- Mean (Std. Dev.) 
- Min (Max) 
 
0.83 (0.80) 
0 (2) 
 
2.13 (1.54) 
0 (4) 
 
2.13 (1.04) 
0 (4) 
 
1.71 (1.32) 
0 (4) 
Total Prompted c 
- Mean (Std. Dev.) 
- Min (Max) 
 
3.24 (1.33) 
1 (6) 
 
5.02 (2.12) 
0 (8) 
 
4.67 (1.93) 
1 (8) 
 
4.33 (1.97) 
0 (8) 
Non-Prompted Present d 
- Mean (Std. Dev.) 
- Min (Max) 
 
2.83 (1.23) 
0 (5) 
 
2.65 (1.36) 
0 (4) 
 
1.73 (1.26) 
0 (5) 
 
2.40 (1.36) 
0 (5) 
Non-Prompted Missing e 
- Mean (Std. Dev.) 
- Min (Max) 
 
1.36 (0.94) 
0 (3) 
 
1 (0.97) 
0 (3.5) 
 
0.72 (0.97) 
0 (3) 
 
1.02 (0.99) 
0 (3.5) 
Total Non-Prompted f 
- Mean (Std. Dev.) 
- Min (Max) 
 
4.19 (1.83) 
1 (7) 
 
3.65 (1.91) 
0 (7.5) 
 
2.45 (1.83) 
0 (6.5) 
 
3.42 (1.97) 
0 (7.5) 
a
 Number of control activities identified by the participants that were present in the case and prompted by the 
decision aid.  The possible range is zero to four. 
b
 Number of control activities identified by the participants that were missing in the case and prompted by the 
decision aid.  The possible range is zero to four. 
c
 Total number of control activities identified that were prompted by the decision aid.  The possible range is 
zero to eight. 
d
 Number of control activities identified by the participants that were present in the case and not prompted by the 
decision aid.  The possible range is zero to five. 
e
 Number of control activities identified by the participants that were missing in the case and not prompted by the 
decision aid.  The possible range is zero to four. 
f
 Total number of control activities identified that were not prompted by the decision aid.  The possible range is zero 
to nine. 
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Table 4. Total Number of Control Activities Identified That Were Prompted By 
The Decision Aid (Total Prompted) 
Panel A: Analysis of Covariance Results 
Source of Variation 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Decision Aid Condition a 35.79 2 17.90 7.511 0.001 
Knowledge (Covariate) 87.32 1 87.32 36.65 <0.001 
Error 204.90 86 2.38   
Panel B: Planned Contrast Pairwise Comparison 
Contrast 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error F(2, 86) Sig. 
H1: No Decision Aid vs. Combined 
Decision Aid b 
-1.35 0.35 14.898 <0.001 
H3: Less Structurally-Restrictive Decision 
Aid vs. More Structurally-Restrictive 
Decision Aid c 
0.14 0.40 0.126 0.724 
a
 Decision Aid Condition: Participants were provided a more structurally-restrictive decision aid, a less structurally-
restrictive decision aid or no decision aid (control). 
b
 Based on the contrast coefficients: No Decision Aid (1) vs. Less Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-0.5) vs. 
More Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-0.5) 
c
 Based on the contrast coefficients: No Decision Aid (0) vs. Less Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (1) vs.  
More Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-1) 
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Table 5. Total Number of Control Activities Identified That Were Not Prompted 
By The Decision Aid (Total Non-Prompted) 
Panel A: Analysis of Covariance Results 
Source of Variation 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Decision Aid Condition a 52.03 2 26.02 10.356 <0.001 
Knowledge (Covariate) 83.94 1 83.94 33.415 <0.001 
Error 216.04 86 2.51   
Panel B: Planned Contrast Pairwise Comparison 
Contrast 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error F(2, 86) Sig. 
H2: No Decision Aid vs. Combined 
Decision Aid b 
1.38 0.36 14.787 <0.001 
H4: Less Structurally-Restrictive Decision 
Aid vs. More Structurally-Restrictive 
Decision Aid c 
0.99 0.41 5.909 0.017 
a
 Decision Aid Condition: Participants were provided a more structurally-restrictive decision aid, a less structurally-
restrictive decision aid or no decision aid (control). 
b
 Based on the contrast coefficients: No Decision Aid (1) vs. Less Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-0.5) vs. 
More Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-0.5) 
c
 Based on the contrast coefficients: No Decision Aid (0) vs. Less Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (1) vs.  
More Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-1) 
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Table 6. Post Hoc Analyses 
Panel A: Hypothesis 1 (No Decision Aid vs. Combined Decision Aid a) 
Variable 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error F(2, 86) Sig. 
Prompted Present c -0.18 0.22 0.651 0.422 
Prompted Missing d -1.18 0.24 23.472 <0.001 
Total Prompted e -1.35 0.35 14.898 <0.001 
Panel B: Hypothesis 2 (No Decision Aid vs. Combined Decision Aid a) 
Variable 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error F(2, 86) Sig. 
Non-Prompted Present f 0.77 0.27 8.528 0.004 
Non-Prompted Missing g 0.61 0.20 9.658 0.003 
Total Non-Prompted h 1.38 0.36 14.787 <0.001 
Panel C: Hypothesis 3 (Less vs. More Structurally-Restrictive Decision aid b) 
Variable 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error F(2, 86) Sig. 
Prompted Present c 0.25 0.25 1.048 0.309 
Prompted Missing d -0.11 0.28 0.16 0.69 
Total Prompted e 0.14 0.40 0.126 0.724 
Panel D: Hypothesis 4 (Less vs. More Structurally-Restrictive Decision aid b) 
Variable 
Mean 
Difference Std.Error F(2, 86) Sig. 
Non-Prompted Present f 0.80 0.30 7.077 0.009 
Non-Prompted Missing g 0.19 0.22 0.752 0.388 
Total Non-Prompted h 0.99 0.41 5.909 0.017 
a
 Based on the contrast coefficients: No Decision Aid (1) vs. Less Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-0.5) vs. 
More Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-0.5) 
b
 Based on the contrast coefficients: No Decision Aid (0) vs. Less Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (1) vs.  
More Structurally-Restrictive Decision Aid (-1) 
c
 Number of control activities identified by the participants that were present in the case and prompted by the 
decision aid 
d
 Number of control activities identified by the participants that were missing in the case and prompted by the 
decision aid 
e
 Total number of control activities identified that were prompted by the decision aid 
f
 Number of control activities identified by the participants that were present in the case and not prompted by the 
decision aid 
g
 Number of control activities identified by the participants that were missing in the case and not prompted by the 
decision aid 
h
 Total number of control activities identified that were not prompted by the decision aid 
 
 
 
 
